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Phoenix and neighboring municipalities, like many in the South and West, pursued a growth 
strategy based on annexation in the decades after World War II.  This paper explores the link 
between annexation and competition for tax revenues.  After discussing arguments for 
annexation, it traces the history of annexation in the Phoenix metropolitan area.  A long-running 
series of "border wars" entailed litigation, pre-emptive annexations, and considerable 
intergovernmental conflict.  The paper argues that tax revenues have been a key motivation for 
annexation, particularly since the 1970s.  It then considers several related policy issues and 
argues that while opportunities for annexation are becoming more limited, competition for tax 
revenues (particularly sales tax revenues) continues to be fierce and to create dilemmas for 
municipalities in the region. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
Phoenix has been one of the most rapidly growing cities in the United States since 1950.  
It was the sixth largest U.S. city in terms of population in July 2003 and a projection based on 
past growth showed that it was likely to pass Philadelphia to take fifth place during 2006.
1  The 
Phoenix metropolitan area ranked fourteenth in 2003, whereas the Philadelphia metropolitan area 
was fourth.  One reason Phoenix=s city ranking was higher than its metropolitan area ranking was 
that the city continued to expand its boundaries dramatically by annexation.  More of the 
metropolitan area population was within the city than in a case like Philadelphia.  In 2003, the 
Phoenix city share of the metropolitan area population was about 39 percent, whereas 
Philadelphia=s was only about 26 percent.
2  
Figure 1 shows the increase in Phoenix=s land area from 1881-2005.  The city grew from 
about 17 square miles in 1950 to about 515 by 2005.  Other cities and towns in Maricopa County, 
which includes 24 municipalities, also expanded by annexation (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
3 
Buckeye grew from under 1 square mile to about 127 by 2000, Peoria from about 1 square mile to 
about 141.   Scottsdale grew rapidly for several decades, although it saw very little annexation in 
the 1990s.  As municipalities approached each other=s boundaries there ensued a long-running 
series of Aborder wars@ or what some called Arange wars.@
4
Expansion by annexation was common throughout the United States in the nineteenth 
century.  In the twentieth century it slowed in the East and Midwest, but continued in the South 
and West, especially after World War II.
5  This paper explores the link between annexation and 
competition for tax revenues.  After discussing arguments for annexation, the paper traces the 
history of annexation in the Phoenix metropolitan area from the 1950s onward.  It argues that tax  
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revenues have been a key motivation, particularly since the 1970s.  The paper then considers 
several policy issues raised by the annexation history and argues that while opportunities for 
annexation are becoming more limited, competition for tax revenues (particularly sales tax 
revenues) continues to be fierce and to create dilemmas for municipalities in the area. 
 
  ARGUMENTS FOR ANNEXATION 
In the Phoenix area the primary argument for annexation, from the perspective of 
municipal officials, often was to obtain tax revenues and fees.  These included sales taxes, 
property taxes, and other revenues such as population-based shared revenues (e.g., state-shared 
taxes and federal revenue sharing).  The population-based state revenues came from the state 
sales tax, income tax, vehicle license tax, and highway user revenue fund; part of these revenues 
are distributed to municipalities each year on the basis of their populations.  From the late 1980s, 
development impact fees also were collected in annexed (and other) areas.   
Of course, annexation brought additional costs as well as revenues.  The League of 
Arizona Cities and Towns encouraged municipalities to undertake studies of the effects of 
annexation before taking action, since Athe additional revenue to be gained must be considered in 
light of the necessary expenditures to provide services to the annexed areas.@
6  In some cases, 
such considerations led to decisions against annexation.  Mesa held off on a proposed annexation 
in 1974 due to concern that financing necessary services in the area would lower the city=s 
income.
7  The city of Phoenix=s staff conducted a series of studies on the budgetary impact of 
annexations.  In several cases they concluded that the short-run cost-revenue relationship was 
negative, but that the longer-run outcome would be more positive.
8 
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Population-based tax revenues motivated municipalities to accomplish annexation before 
the next census so that residents of the annexed territory would be included in population totals.  
Gilbert=s Acting Town Manager advised the Town Council and Planning and Zoning Commission 
that Aduring the calendar year 1979, annexation should be an important issue for the Council, P & 
Z Commission and the Town staff,@ since the town=s boundaries for the 1980 census would 
include areas annexed before January 1, 1980.
9  Buckeye, a town of 5,600, annexed state prison 
facilities so that the inmates would be counted in the town=s population in the 2000 census.  At 
full capacity the facilities were expected to hold 4,600 inmates, which would bring an additional 
$1.3 million in state tax revenues each year.  The town planned to use the revenues to upgrade its 
infrastructure and it agreed to provide police and fire protection and waste removal to the prison 
facilities.
10   
By annexing, cities also sought to avoid being ringed by independent municipalities with 
their own taxing powers.  In Cities Without Suburbs, David Rusk (former mayor of Albuquerque) 
argued that cities must be Aelastic@ in order to grow.  An elastic city Ahad vacant city land to 
develop and the political and legal tools to annex new land.@
11  Phoenix city officials and staff 
clearly shared this view.  APhoenix has had an aggressive annexation policy, officials explain, to 
prevent a landlocked core city that eventually would decay and cause residents to move to the 
suburbs.  Instead, [Mayor] Barrow said, >we annexed the suburbs.=@
12  A 1974 staff report had 
compared Phoenix to cities which did not annex between 1950 and 1970.  It concluded that 
annexation provided an expanding tax base and protected the city against a proliferation of 
incorporated cities or annexations by other cities.
13  In 1978, Councilman Howard Adams was 
explicit about revenue motivations: AIt=s incumbent upon us to protect our pocketbook . . . and  
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keep bedroom communities from sapping our financial strength.@
14  Mayor Margaret Hance, 
echoing the 1974 report, said annexation policy had been Athe single most important factor in the 
health and vitality of Phoenix.@
15
In some cases, the goal of annexation was to capture existing sources of revenue, such as 
the factory outlet mall inside a 12-square-mile area near New River annexed by Phoenix in 
1995.
16  Often, however, annexation was in anticipation of future development.  For example, in 
1987 Gilbert annexed 150 acres at the southeast corner of Gilbert and Williams Field Road; plans 
for the area included a major shopping center, auto sales mall, office complex, and residential 
housing.
17  Sales tax revenues were especially desired and auto malls topped the list of sought-
after developments.   
For at least several decades, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Phoenix=s 
fiscal structure has been more dependent on sales taxes than U.S. municipalities as a whole.  
General and selective sales taxes as a share of general revenue are shown in Table 2.  The share in 
Phoenix has been considerably higher than in all municipalities since 1969-70.  In Scottsdale, 
sales taxes were reported in 2005 to make up half of the city=s operating budget, with sales taxes 
from auto deals accounting for about 17 percent of those sales taxes.
18  More than one-quarter of 
the municipalities in the Phoenix metropolitan area had no primary or secondary property tax in 
early 2005.
19  Most were small municipalities, but they included Mesa, a city of almost one-half 
million people in 2004.  (Municipalities in Arizona are not responsible for school finance; that 
responsibility lies with school districts, which levy their own taxes.)   
For municipalities with a property tax, sales tax revenues might nonetheless be a more 
desired source of revenue than property taxes on residences, since the commercial establishments  
  5 
generating sales tax revenues require fewer municipal expenditures than residential development. 
 Studies show that for each dollar of tax revenue generated, the median cost of public services for 
residential development is $1.16, for commercial and industrial development, $.27, and for 
working lands (such as farms and forests) and open space, $.36.
20  As noted above, in making 
decisions about annexation, it was important for municipalities to consider not only the revenue 
but also the expenditure consequences of those decisions.  
A second argument made by municipalities for annexation was that it would allow for 
orderly, planned growth.  Planning staff for the city of Mesa, which was considering annexing 14 
square miles in 1978, explained that ACity zoning laws are tougher than those of Maricopa 
County, which administers unincorporated land . . .@
21  A former Phoenix City Council member 
claimed that ASome of the worst problems the cities have is in areas where (land was) annexed 
from the counties.  Counties have just a hodgepodge of zoning that=s inappropriate.  In the 
counties= defense--some of the stuff is very old--they were not equipped to make those kinds of 
(planning and zoning) decisions.@
22  Municipalities also did not want to have to upgrade 
infrastructure when areas eventually came within their boundaries. 
Annexation also may contribute to orderly development by simplifying the political 
structure of a region.  Maricopa County has only 24 municipalities, whereas the Chicago region 
has 265 and the Los Angeles region approximately 180.  Fewer jurisdictions may reduce political 
fragmentation leading to land-use mismanagement.
23  A 1977 editorial in the Arizona Republic, 
strongly defending annexation in the 1950s and later, claimed that A .  .  . the entire Valley of the 
Sun would be a governmental shambles if annexation hadn=t been carried out@
24 (although it did 
not elaborate on the deleterious consequences).  
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From the perspective of some residents, annexation was desirable because of the 
municipal services it would bring, and some city officials cited extension of services as one of 
their motivations.  Other residents, however, had moved precisely to avoid living in a city and 
opposed annexation.  Some did not wish to pay city property taxes even though services would 
improve.
25  Property owners sometimes asked for assurance in advance that a property would be 
rezoned (e.g., from agricultural to commercial) if they agreed to annexation.
26    
Annexations also were requested by some developers.  For example, Continental Homes 
asked the Phoenix City Council to consider annexation of Pima Ranch, where it hoped to create a 
major residential development.  The Council scheduled a policy session in January 1980 to 
discuss the pros and cons of the case and the financial implications of annexing a larger area, 
including Pima Ranch, south of the city.  Avanti Mortgage Company of Phoenix, which wanted to 
develop a 33-acre industrial park, requested annexation of 620 acres in 1987 in order to receive 
Phoenix services.  However, other developers opposed annexation of undeveloped areas, 
preferring to develop under county jurisdiction and have residents request annexation later if they 
wished.  Pulte Homes, for example, opposed annexation by Queen Creek of a project site in Pinal 
County in 1998 because the town would require lower-density zoning than the county.  If Pulte 
could get the land rezoned in the county before annexation, the more profitable higher-density 
zoning would persist even if the town later annexed the land.
27
Arizona=s 1980 Ground Water Management Act required that new subdivisions in Active 
Management Areas, where groundwater was being depleted, have a 100-year water supply.  This 
created a reason for developers to seek annexation of their properties by municipalities, since the 
properties then would qualify as having an assured water supply.
28  In the mid-1980s, water also  
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may have been a motivation for municipalities to annex.  Legislators in 1985 voiced concerns that 
cities were Abattling for more land so they can qualify for more Central Arizona Project water.@
29  
More recently in Peoria, however, availability of water has become a precondition for annexation 
rather than a motivation.  The city is not eager to annex areas that do not bring their own water 
supply with them, and it requires that development and annexation agreements for large 
developments include a water budget indicating anticipated demand and supply.  In some areas 
without sufficient groundwater, developers were required to pay for the drilling of new wells at a 
distance; they eventually would be used to pipe water into the area.
30
In some U.S. cities, annexation was motivated by a desire to dilute the city=s minority 
vote.
31  In the Phoenix area, some annexations, especially in later decades, were of territory 
containing few people; they did not bring a large additional white population into the city.  
Phoenix also had a smaller nonwhite population than many other annexing cities.
32  However, the 
issue was raised in Phoenix in 1979, following several annexations that added thousands of 
voters.  Plaintiffs in a suit filed in October claimed that an annexation in May diluted the strength 
of minority voters.  The plaintiffs sought to halt the November 6 primary election on the grounds 
that the annexation and precinct changes had not been screened by U.S. Department of Justice as 
required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Screening determined whether racial and ethnic 
voting patterns reflected those of the rest of a city, so that minority voting rights were not 
weakened.  The Justice Department allowed the May annexation to become effective without 
objection, although it reserved the right to object later.
33
Racial considerations may have worked against annexation of certain areas.  Amy Bridges 
argued that in the 1950s, annexation of poor African-American communities into Phoenix was  
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delayed, whereas newer communities further out were annexed and provided with streets and 
utilities.  The black community in the southernmost part of Phoenix Awas annexed just in time for 
the 1960 census.@
34  She did not explicitly argue that revenue concerns overcame the earlier 
reluctance to annex these areas, but as noted above, a larger population at census time meant 
greater revenues for a municipality. 
 
  ANNEXATION IN THE VALLEY OF THE SUN 
1950s: Tax Exemptions for Industrialists 
Significant annexation in the Phoenix area dates from the late 1950s.  Municipal reform in 
1948-1950 established Charter Government, with a strong city manager and better municipal 
administration.  Potential Phoenix residents had more confidence that, if annexed, they would live 
in a well-managed city.  Previously, many fringe area property owners who thought municipal 
government was inefficient and unprofessional had refused to sign annexation petitions.  
Annexation initially proceeded slowly, due in part to lack of city staff and to legal and political 
challenges by annexation opponents.  Major cities sought changes in state laws to make 
annexation easier, but legislation governing the annexation process actually became more 
restrictive in the mid-1950s.
35   However, based on his study of Phoenix during 1944-1973, 
William Collins concluded that Ain the end the annexation law, while not simple, proved liberal 
enough to allow the city to acquire nearly all the land that it sought.@
36   
The role of revenue motivations in early annexation efforts is not entirely clear.  Phoenix 
City Manager Ray W. Wilson denied in 1951 that the need for more tax revenues was a reason for 
city expansion and thought that Aannexed areas receive more in services for several years than  
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they contribute in taxes.@
37  The argument for annexation made by the Arizona Republic in 1957 
was that APhoenix is a metropolitan area.  Industries in this area can choose between a handful of 
small, autonomous cities, with duplicating services and inefficient operation, or one large 
municipality of the model type now enjoyed by Phoenix.  We=ll choose the latter, and we think 
most people will agree.@
38  In 1958, to ensure successful annexation, the city was willing to 
forego sales tax revenues, as well as to amend its building code and zoning ordinance and to 
assure property owners that property tax rates would remain stable.  Industrialists in southeastern 
and southwestern areas opposed annexation and argued that they needed tax exemptions to 
compete effectively while being inside the city.  On March 24, 1959, voters approved 14 
exemptions to the city sales tax for business and industry and the annexations proceeded.
39   
However, John Williams, the city=s finance director, argued that increased property tax 
revenues from the highly valued industries would offset the lost sales tax revenues.
40  According 
to John Wenum, who studied annexation by Phoenix and neighboring municipalities, Adespite 
their disavowal of tax-base expansion as a goal of annexation, nine [of forty-one public and 
private] respondents indicated that this might have been a consideration in the annexation of a 
large industrial tract in 1959.@
41  An Arizona Republic editorial in 1975 stated that Athe industries 
have paid far more in property taxes than they have saved through the sales tax >concessions= .  .  . 
 the voters approved the small price paid for annexation in return for the much larger benefits that 
would stem from having these firms in the city.@
42
1960s: Contested Borders 
By the end of the 1950s, cities were approaching each others= boundaries (see Figure 3) 
and considerable acrimony ensued.  The most heated conflict, which began in 1956, was between  
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Phoenix and Scottsdale.  The two cities ended up in protracted court battles after attempting to 
annex the same land.
43  The Arizona Republic reported in March 1963 that the Arecurring 
annexation war between Phoenix and Scottsdale erupted anew yesterday@ and noted a few days 
later that Ain this vast space, two booming Valley cities are competing for the right to expand to 
make way for future growth.@
44  Scottsdale accused Phoenix of Atrying to hem us in from the 
north.@
45  Scottsdale=s original incorporation in 1951 was motivated by its fear of being 
swallowed up by Phoenix.  Tempe and Glendale also reacted to Phoenix=s expansion by 
attempting to annex, sometimes unsuccessfully.  Relations between Phoenix and Glendale were 
not as bitter as those among the other cities, for several reasons including the fact that some 
residents on Glendale=s fringe actually preferred to be annexed into Phoenix.
46   
Some efforts were made to halt the border wars, although they did not always have lasting 
success.  Phoenix and Glendale created a Aneutral area@ in 1958 and later extended the 
arrangement to other areas.  Phoenix and Scottsdale agreed on Aspheres of annexation influence@ 
in 1964.  In 1968, Chandler and Tempe passed a Agentlemen=s agreement@ setting out which areas 
could be annexed by each city in the future without prior approval of the other city and 
establishing an open area between them which was to be jointly planned.
47  The agreement was 
reaffirmed in 1971 but violated by Chandler in 1974, setting off the annexations by Gilbert and 
other cities described below.
48   
Similar attempts were made in later years.  In 1978, Phoenix and Scottsdale agreed not to 
annex land across their respective sides of Scottsdale Road, and in 1985 the two cities agreed  
upon the 56th street alignment as a future boundary.  In order to gain Phoenix=s assent to its 
incorporation, Cave Creek agreed in 1986 not to extend its boundaries south of the Carefree  
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Highway.  But it later reneged on that agreement, claiming it was a Ablackmail agreement.@
49  In 
1987, Chandler entered an agreement with Gilbert to draw a boundary line dividing 16 square 
miles of unclaimed land between the two communities; the hope was that the agreement would 
prevent future Aland grabs@ and contribute to more systematic planning.
50  As growth spread 
beyond Maricopa County to Pinal County (between Phoenix and Tucson), the municipalities of 
Casa Grande, Coolidge, Florence, Maricopa, and Eloy worked on official intergovernmental 
agreements to replace gentlemen=s agreements made in the 1980s but ignored by new city and 
town managers.
51
1970s: Pre-emptive Strip Annexation 
In their annexations, municipalities could not Ajump over@ land that had been annexed by 
another city, even if that land was simply a narrow strip of property intended to serve as a barrier 
to another municipality=s expansion.  The area inside the strip remained county land (referred to 
as a Acounty island@) until the strip-annexing municipality chose to annex it.  A 1974 annexation 
by Chandler spurred Gilbert in 1975 to create the largest county island to date with a strip varying 
in width up to 200 feet that enclosed a 51 square mile area (see Figure 4).
52  Gilbert was seeking 
to prevent similar action by Mesa or Chandler.  In 1978 Gilbert was a town of 4,100 that was 
anticipated to grow to 125,000.  Gilbert Mayor Dale Hallock explained that ABy doing the 
stripping we=ve taken in everything that could ever be in Gilbert and now we are in a position to 
very slowly go ahead and develop it.@
53  In a 1976 interview, Town Manager Lynn Stuart also 
emphasized planning considerations and citizens= desire that Gilbert keep its rural atmosphere.
54  
County islands created headaches for county officials in law enforcement, road 
maintenance, and construction, who claimed that municipalities only annexed parts that benefited  
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them, leaving behind pockets that needed extensive road work or bridges.  In the Gilbert case, the 
county Board of Supervisors was reluctant to continue developing highways inside the island, but 
ultimately it did.
55  Maricopa County Manager Robert Mauney argued that  
Cities and towns look at annexation as a business venture, and the profit  
motive is always there.  They want the tax base, but they don=t want to  
have to put a lot of money into improvements.  That=s why many of them 
wait until roads and other improvements are completed before they consider 
annexation.
56
County islands continued to pose problems and the League of Arizona Cities and Towns 
pressed for legislation making it easier to eliminate them.  A bill (not introduced by the League) 
that was signed into law in 2003 allowed counties to initiate annexations of parcels of 10 acres or 
less, though the process would be halted if more than half of the property owners, or cities and 
towns, objected.
57  Some municipalities decided to cut off emergency and fire protection services 
to residents of nearby county islands who were not paying taxes to the municipalities and had 
contracted instead for services with a more distant private supplier (Rural/Metro).  Not 
surprisingly, such decisions were controversial, as when Goodyear refused to respond to a near-
drowning call just outside the city.  Ultimately services were resumed by Goodyear and 
Avondale, who planned to charge Rural/Metro a steep price for providing them.
58
The 1975 Gilbert strip annexation was challenged in court.  The annexation law required 
consent of the owners of at least 51 percent of the assessed valuation of the area to be annexed.  
The suit claimed that Gilbert annexed all of the property of those favoring annexation, but only 
part of the property of those opposing it.  The rest of their property was not included in the 
calculations to determine whether 51 percent was attained.  The Arizona Republic reported that 
ALawyers for the town concede it used that method in its annexation, but say the action was  
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legal.@
59  The annexation was upheld, but the case helped to generate changes in the legislation 
discussed below.  A ruling by the Arizona Court of Appeals in a later case noted that AGlick 
indicated that some cities were engaging in Astrip@ annexation, that is, were artificially extending 
their boundaries to include potentially high value taxable areas, or to defend against the 
encroachment of equally aggressive neighboring municipalities.@
60
One neighboring East Valley community--Mesa--was reported to have been relatively 
unconcerned by Gilbert=s 1975 annexation.
61  However, Mesa pursued its own aggressive 
annexation plans and municipalities to the west of Phoenix, including Tolleson, Avondale, 
Goodyear, and Peoria, all joined in border wars in 1976-77.  Like Buckeye in more recent years, 
the first three were tiny communities (populations under 7,000 in 1970) that added vast amounts 
of land.  In June 1976, Phoenix strip annexed around an area of about 37 square miles Ain 
response to the threat that Tolleson would annex an area that Phoenix officials feel is in the path 
of natural Phoenix expansion.@
62  It added another 5 square miles in July Aso Avondale wouldn=t 
annex the world,@ according to Councilman Ken O=Dell.
63  In July 1977, Phoenix annexed a 25-
foot-wide strip around a 14-square-mile area in Deer Valley.  An editorial in the Arizona Republic 
asserted that Phoenix was Aagain maintaining its right to grow@ in the face of possible 
incorporation of a city of Deer Valley or possible strip annexation of the area by Peoria.
64
Stealth was involved in some cases.  In May 1976, AGoodyear annexed a parcel of land a 
few hours ahead of its neighbor city [Avondale],@ sparking a dispute.
65  A few years later the 
Arizona Republic reported that Athe southern boundary of Phoenix was locked into place 
permanently Thursday when the City Council called a special annexation meeting on short notice 
to head off a rumored intrusion by Chandler into the Ahwatukee area.@
66  Chandler had been  
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scheduled to consider an annexation that Thursday night. 
1980s: Changes in Annexation Legislation 
The 1980s brought two important changes in annexation legislation.  Strip annexation was 
outlawed in 1980.  AA city or town shall not annex territory if as a result of such annexation 
unincorporated territory is completely surrounded by the annexing city or town.@
67  Territory  
annexed had to adjoin the annexing municipality for at least three hundred feet and had to be at 
least two hundred feet in width, exclusive of highways, and no more than twice as long as it was 
wide.
68  In 1986, other changes made annexation more difficult.  A waiting period of thirty days 
before signatures could be collected on an annexation petition was imposed.  During that time a 
public hearing had to be held after notices had been published, posted, and mailed to relevant 
parties.  The petition had to be Asigned by the owners of one-half or more in value of the real and 
personal property and more than one-half of the persons owning real and personal property that 
would be subject to taxation by the city or town in the event of annexation.@
69  Previously, 
annexations could be done with the signatures of a very few large owners whose property was 
worth more than one-half of the assessed value in the area to be annexed.  In one extreme case in 
1977, the 14-square-mile Deer Valley annexation, Phoenix annexed the entire area with the 
signature of a single property owner.
70
Some cities rushed to annex before the 1980 legislation took effect.  Scottsdale=s City 
Council met at 7 a.m. on June 30, 1980 to approve an annexation by which a 10-foot-wide strip 
enclosed 86 square miles, an area nearly equal to the city=s size.  The action was challenged by 
several lawsuits alleging violations of the state=s open-meeting law.  In July, Chandler prepared 
plans to surround 36 square miles with a similar strip.
71  Despite the outlawing of strip  
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annexation, annexation wars continued in the early 1980s.  Conflicts among Phoenix, Scottsdale, 
Cave Creek, and Peoria were an important impetus for the 1986 legislation.
72  As an initial step in 
1985, a one-year moratorium on city annexation involving state land was approved.  Legislators 
wanted a year to study possible legislative changes; they feared annexations of outlying areas 
would encourage leap-frog development, discourage in-fill, and drain a city=s water resources.
73  
In addition to making the changes described above, the 1986 legislation allowed deannexation of 
territory to cure some of the problems created by past strip annexation.  However, because the 
deannexation law only applied to a select group of Arizona cities and towns, it was declared 
unconstitutional in 1990 by the Arizona Supreme Court.
74
After the passage of the 1986 legislation and in response to Phoenix City Council 
discussions on the merits of annexation, a multi-departmental task force produced an annexation 
policy study analyzing the issues.  City Council member Linda Nadolski had been vocal in 
opposing further annexation, which she argued had negative fiscal consequences for existing city 
neighborhoods.  Others had suggested that the city should promote growth within its existing 
boundaries and thought that annexation encouraged urban sprawl.  The annexation policy study 
reaffirmed the conclusion of the 1974 staff report that annexation had positive long-term benefits. 
 It did, however, recommend careful determination of which areas should be annexed and of the 
optimum timing for annexation.  Evaluation criteria were proposed to be used by staff in 
reviewing each proposed annexation area.  Phoenix planning officials remained committed to a 
policy of expansion, although the Planning Department did reject a few annexations that did not 
seem appropriate at the time they were proposed.  Both revenue and planning considerations 
remained important for city officials.
75 
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1990s: West Valley Growth 
Although the tightening of the legislation made it more difficult, annexation continued in 
the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1 and Figure 5).  Much of the annexation of the 1990s occurred in 
the West Valley, with Buckeye and Peoria registering especially large increases in land area.  For 
some time Peoria and Phoenix had been jockeying for position in the northwestern area near Lake 
Pleasant.  A compromise plan recommended by the State Land Commissioner in 1987 identified 
areas for future annexation by each city and left about 40 percent of the contested area outside 
both.  Annexations within these areas proceeded in later years.
76
Buckeye=s expansion was the most dramatic.  It followed in the footsteps of Surprise, 
another small West Valley municipality that had annexed a large amount of territory in the 1980s 
to position itself for future development.  In 1999, Buckeye annexed the site that would become 
the Verrado development created by DMB Associates.  With an annual town budget of $2.6 
million, Buckeye hoped to see Verrado bring annual property-tax revenue of $10 million.  An 
even larger annexation of 35,000 acres in 2002 had been requested by the developers of Douglas 
Ranch, a master-planned community that eventually could include 83,000 homes over the next 
half-century.  John DiTullio, the developer=s representative, and Buckeye Mayor Dusty Hull 
argued that the annexation would bring control of water resources essential for the town=s future 
growth.  With Douglas Ranch added to other large-scale developments already approved by the 
Buckeye Town Council, over 240,000 new housing units were projected for a town whose 
population at the time was approximately 7,000.  As a result of its ambitious annexations, 
Buckeye became second in area only to Phoenix among Valley municipalities.
77  
An overall shift in the focus of growth from the East Valley to the West Valley occurred  
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in the 1990s and after, partly due to development of highways west of Phoenix and to availability 
of land.  In 1991, about 26 percent of Valley housing starts occurred in the west; by 1999 its share 
was 40 percent, more than the northeast or southeast.  Population continued to soar in many East 
Valley municipalities as well, but the West Valley attained a new presence in the region.  Its 
municipalities competed hard for facilities; Glendale was successful in two major cases.  It landed 
the new Coyotes hockey arena after negotiations for a Scottsdale site at Los Arcos failed, and it 
won out over Tempe and Mesa after a nearly two-year battle to attract the Cardinals football 
stadium, scheduled to open for the 2006 season.  Glendale offered an attractive site to be 
purchased by the Cardinals and the creation of a Community Facilities District, which would 
issue bonds for $48 million of on- and off-site improvements and retire the bonds through a 
combination of parking fees, surcharges, and sales taxes at the site.
78
Glendale also reversed its annexation policy in 2005 as projected improvements in the 
Loop 303 freeway led city officials to anticipate increases in land values and development along 
the freeway route.  This area lay within the territory strip-annexed by Glendale in the 1970s.  The 
city had not been eager to annex the unincorporated territory and had considered annexations only 
if property owners approached the city and were east of 115th Avenue.  However, with the 
prospect of sales, construction, and property taxes from new properties included within the city, 
Glendale began actively courting property owners for annexations.
79  
2000-: State Trust Lands 
Further opportunities for annexation are becoming more limited.  Much of the remaining 
undeveloped land around Phoenix is owned by the state or federal government or by Native 
American tribal communities.  State trust lands are available for annexation and pose some  
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interesting issues.  At the time of Arizona=s State Enabling Act in 1910, which allowed the 
Territory of Arizona to prepare for statehood, sections of each township were assigned to be held 
in trust for funding public schools.  This was a common practice but unlike many states, Arizona 
retained ownership of much of its trust land rather than selling it quickly.  The trust has a 
fiduciary responsibility to manage its assets in the interests of its beneficiaries and the Arizona 
Enabling Act and Arizona Constitution specify that the trust lands cannot be sold or leased except 
to the highest and best bidder at a public auction.  These requirements put constraints on what the 
Arizona State Land Department can do with the land and create difficulties for environmental 
groups and municipalities that want to see open space preserved rather than developed.  At 
auctions during 2004, state trust lands sold at prices well above their appraised values, sometimes 
double or more the initial value.
80  More recently, appraisals have been raised to higher levels. 
Border wars can occur over state trust land as well as privately owned land, with more 
than one municipality hoping to annex the same piece of land.  The State Land Department 
declined to take sides in the dispute between Phoenix and Peoria over land near Lake Pleasant.  
Instead, it required that the two cities work out their boundary dispute before the State Selection 
Board approved their annexation requests in December 2002.  Phoenix had sought to annex west 
to 79th Avenue; Peoria had included the area east to 67th Avenue in its General Plan and objected 
to Phoenix=s annexation request.  The boundary ultimately ended up following the 75th Avenue 
alignment north of New River Road.
81  Additional annexations of state trust lands are likely, 
including lands in Pinal County.  Future disposition of state trust lands may be affected by 
legislative reform efforts that had been underway for several years by 2005. 
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  POLICY ISSUES 
In addition to helping explain how Phoenix grew to its current size and urban form, the 
history of annexation raises some interesting policy issues.  First, did the bitter history of 
annexation wars make it more difficult for municipalities to cooperate on matters of regional 
concern, such as transportation or environmental issues?  While some planners and others think it 
may have played a role, it was difficult to find examples of specific policy decisions that were 
blocked or made poorly that could be attributed to this cause.  There may have been some 
examples in the area of transportation, such as streets from Phoenix that were not aligned to make 
it easy for Phoenix shoppers to get to Scottsdale, or delays in their construction.
82  On the other 
hand, municipalities did succeed in coming to agreement on a major transit plan associated with a 
November 2004 referendum to extend a half-cent sales tax due to expire after its initial 20 years.  
Ongoing difficulties in reaching cooperation among municipalities may be due not primarily to 
historical memories of annexation wars, but to current situations that appear to participants to be 
zero-sum games. 
A second policy issue emerges when annexation and the associated land-based growth 
path are no longer an option.  What happens when a city runs out of land?  What changes in 
policy become necessary when a city no longer can count on tax revenues from extensive growth? 
 Scottsdale faces precisely this dilemma, partly due to its commitment in the 1990s to 
preservation of desert open space.  By 2003, Scottsdale had only about 4,000 acres of developable 
land left of its 117,000 acres and new-home prices were soaring.  The Morrison Institute for 
Public Policy issued a report arguing that Scottsdale needed to focus on intensive development 
and redevelopment and to become involved in three regional efforts: genome research, initiatives  
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associated with Arizona State University, and a (related) push to top-tier science and technology 
status.  The city decided to put $130 million into redevelopment of the Los Arcos Mall into the 
ASU Scottsdale Center for New Technology and Innovation.  High-rise developments were 
accepted downtown as part of the more intensive strategy.
83
Chandler is looking ahead; anticipating that vacant land would be nearly gone by 2010, it 
commissioned in 2003 an initial study of build-out, and in 2004 a more extensive one.  The city=s 
goal is to avoid serious strain on the municipal budget as revenues from new home construction 
stop.  Retail and employment growth are expected to lag behind residential growth, but services 
still must be provided to residents.  Similarly, a Gilbert mayoral candidate warned in January 
2005 that AGilbert=s growth may reach build-out in less than eight years, some five or six years 
ahead of schedule.@
84
Tempe was landlocked early on (see Table 1).  It successfully redeveloped (or gentrified) 
its downtown during the 1980s.
85  However, one tool that appears to have been important--the 
exercise of eminent domain--may be less available to Scottsdale or other municipalities.  Eminent 
domain has never been popular in Arizona, a strong property-rights state.  Recent controversial 
cases inflamed opposition.  When Mesa tried to exercise eminent domain for redevelopment in 
the case of Bailey Brake Service, many viewed the action as a taking for private developers rather 
than serving a genuine public purpose.  The courts ultimately blocked the action and the state 
legislature made the exercise of eminent domain more difficult by requiring a two-thirds Council 
vote and more public reviews and process.
86
Phoenix probably will not face this dilemma for several decades, especially with its recent 
annexations in the north, but there is concern about strengthening the city=s downtown and about  
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the impact of ongoing expansion at the periphery upon the city=s core.  Phoenix established a 
Downtown Development Office in July 2004 and a major redevelopment plan including a 
downtown campus for Arizona State University, bioscience centers, light rail, and high-density 
housing, was adopted by the City Council in December.  At the same time, Phoenix appeared to 
be seeking to keep its options open for extensive growth.  When Cave Creek sought in 2004 to 
annex 11 square miles, pushing its western border to 24th Street, Phoenix objected to the State 
Land Department.  Cave Creek Mayor Victor Francia was reported to believe that Phoenix=s 
action was a payback for Cave Creek=s betrayal of its 1986 promise not to extend south of 
Carefree Highway. Whether or not that was the case, the 11-square-mile annexation by Cave 
Creek would make it more difficult for Phoenix to annex Anthem and New River in the future.  It 
was unclear whether Phoenix eventually would seek to annex these areas as part of further 
northern expansion, although Rick Naimark, executive assistant to the Phoenix city manager, 
denied that there were any plans to do so.
87
Finally, even as the annexation wars wound down, competition for tax revenues remained 
intense.  When David Richert became Phoenix Planning Director in 1992, City Manager Frank 
Fairbanks gave him a directive to stop the bleeding of sales tax at the city=s borders.
88  Within 
municipalities, the push for sales tax revenues may have led to inferior planning and zoning 
decisions.  Debra Stark, Peoria=s Community Development Director in 2004, cited cases where 
properties were zoned for commercial use but were unable to attract commercial development, sat 
vacant, and eventually had to be down-zoned.
89  Or, too many retail facilities may be built, they 
struggle to survive, and cities end up with empty buildings if they fail. 
In the Phoenix area as elsewhere, municipalities compete by offering subsidies to  
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developers to locate shopping or auto malls within their boundaries.  It certainly would seem to be 
in municipalities= interest, especially at a time of tight budgets, to avoid paying large subsidies for 
developments that would locate somewhere in the region in any case.
90  The dilemma, of course, 
is that they risk losing the development to another municipality willing to pay, and many 
municipal officials feel that if the subsidies succeed, they are worth the price.  Citizens do not 
always agree; Scottsdale ultimately decided through a voter referendum not to provide a $36.7 
million subsidy, approved by the City Council, to Wal-Mart to locate at the site of the former Los 
Arcos Mall in south Scottsdale.
91  
Joint revenue sharing agreements, in which municipalities agree to share the sales tax 
revenues generated by a mall regardless of where it locates, can eliminate this dilemma.    
Phoenix and Scottsdale tried unsuccessfully in the 1990s to create a joint revenue-sharing 
agreement for development along North Scottsdale Road, which divides the two cities and which 
at its intersection with the Loop 101 freeway is one of the last remaining areas for development.  
Part of the problem is that whichever municipality feels it is winning the competition has less 
incentive to make an agreement; over the years the balance shifted between Scottsdale and 
Phoenix.  Scottsdale snared Nordstrom for the Scottsdale Fashion Square Mall with a subsidy of 
$27.5 million in the early 1990s.  But more recently Phoenix landed major commercial 
developments along the west side of Scottsdale Road, including a $100 million luxury auto mall 
that opened in 2002 and popular new shopping areas such as Desert Ridge Marketplace and 
Kierland Commons.
92
There have been two successful cases of revenue-sharing agreements between Tempe and 
Chandler.  The first (1996) was for the Arizona Mills Mall, which ultimately landed in Tempe.   
  23 
What is striking about this case is the role of the developers, who ultimately pushed the cities to 
come to agreement.
93  This agreement was terminated in 2003 on the grounds that Athere has been 
substantial commercial development within Chandler and the perpetual sharing agreement is no 
longer necessary.@
94  Tempe and Chandler also worked out an agreement in 1998 over a Chapman 
Chevrolet dealership that ended up in Chandler.  They agreed not to provide tax rebates; the host 
city was to receive the first $4 million in tax revenues and 75 percent thereafter.
95   
Much more typical, however, were large incentives, such as the $60 million offered by 
Gilbert and estimated $40 million by neighboring Chandler to lure auto malls.  An agreement was 
announced in 2004 but it involved both malls being built without sharing revenue.
96  Some 
Arizona legislators have not been pleased with municipal competition for tax revenues and 
introduced legislation during 2004 to restrict it.  Municipalities and the League of Arizona Cities 
and Towns opposed the legislation, arguing that the ability to offer inducements was an important 
power for municipalities to retain.  The League was against any diminution of local control or 
increase in outside legislative interference.   
In hopes of forestalling further legislative initiatives, the mayors of six municipalities 
(Avondale, Chandler, Peoria, Phoenix, Scottsdale, and Tempe) announced in January 2005 that 
they were working together on agreements to stop sales-tax incentive wars.  But state Senator 
Ken Cheuvront, D-Phoenix, and others introduced bills aiming to end Aoutlandish deals@; their 
goal was to Aforce the cities to stop giving public subsidies to big-box retail stores and auto 
malls.@
97   Legislation was signed by the governor in April 2005 that placed conditions on 
municipalities entering into retail development tax incentive agreements, including a requirement 
that a municipality make findings concerning an agreement=s necessity and financial benefits.   
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Chandler, Phoenix, and Tempe did ultimately agree to a truce creating a Ano-incentive zone,@ but 
only in a small area along a portion of the cities= mutual borders.
98
 
  CONCLUSION 
The history of urban growth in the Phoenix metropolitan area has been one of expansion 
onto inexpensive land from which tax revenues could be reaped as new areas were annexed into 
municipalities.  These fiscal considerations were an important motivation for annexation, 
particularly from the 1970s onward, although other factors such as a desire for planning control 
and sheer boosterism should not be overlooked.   The resulting border wars entailed court battles, 
pre-emptive land grabs, and mistrust between municipalities.  They ultimately helped to provoke 
state legislation in the 1980s that outlawed strip annexation and made annexation more difficult.  
Annexation continued, however, both by municipalities such as Phoenix which already had grown 
large but continued to see physical expansion as crucial to ongoing prosperity and by tiny 
communities in the West Valley such as Buckeye which sought to replicate the experience of 
Phoenix in earlier decades. 
By the turn of the century, limits to annexation and to extensive growth were being 
approached by several communities, but competition for tax revenues continued unabated.  As 
some municipalities considered more intensive development strategies, inducements to 
developers to locate within their boundaries often were an important part of the package.  The 
distributional consequences of those inducements led to opposition both from citizen=s groups and 
from state legislators concerned about the transfer of funds from municipalities to private firms.  
Where extensive growth continued, in more distant areas such as Pinal County, some  
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municipalities hoped to craft intergovernmental agreements that might help prevent repetition of 
the earlier history of border wars in Maricopa County.  
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Growth of Phoenix, 1881-2005 
 
 
SOURCE: City of Phoenix, Phoenix Summary Budget 2005-06, Community Profile and Trends, 
p. 16, at http://phoenix.gov/BUDGET/bud05pro.pdf.                         
 
  36 FIGURE 2 
Annexation by Maricopa County Cities and Towns, 1950-2000 
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SOURCE: Maps taken from “City Growth Time Line,” Maricopa County Planning and 
Development Department, Phoenix, Arizona. 
 
 
 FIGURE 3 
Annexation by Maricopa County Cities and Towns, 1950-1960 
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SOURCE: Maps taken from “City Growth Time Line,” Maricopa County Planning and 
Development Department, Phoenix, Arizona. 
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SOURCE: Arizona Republic, January 19, 1975, B6.  Used with permission.  Permission does not 
imply endorsement.     
 
  39 FIGURE 5 
Annexation by Maricopa County Cities and Towns, 1980-2000 
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SOURCE: Maps taken from “City Growth Time Line,” Maricopa County Planning and 
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Avondale  0.54 1.10 2.26  5.08 22.01 40.62 
Buckeye  0.83 0.83 1.07  2.13 14.51  126.82 
Carefree        8.80  8.81 
Cave  Creek        22.60  27.89 
Chandler  0.68 2.89 4.11 23.63 47.84 52.94 
El  Mirage    0.22  2.13 7.60 9.92 9.92 
Fountain  Hills        16.67  18.23 
Gila  Bend      2.87 2.87 8.66  22.43 
Gilbert  0.97 0.97 0.97  6.72 27.28 35.29 
Glendale  1.27 3.66  15.23 39.45 50.30 54.34 
Goodyear  0.31 0.45 1.02  5.91  113.85  115.37 
Guadalupe       0.75 0.75 0.82 
Litchfield  Park        2.30  2.97 
Mesa  5.82 13.77 19.70  65.38 113.20 124.38 
Paradise  Valley      13.40 13.60 15.23 15.40 
Peoria   1.08 3.72 21.85 60.72  140.68 
Phoenix  16.09  110.95  245.50 321.03 420.36 475.15 
Queen  Creek        10.14  22.22 
Scottsdale    3.38 61.34 107.08 182.36 183.19 
Surprise     1.06  1.47 60.30 67.70 
Tempe  2.19  13.09  24.61 37.98 39.64 39.88 
Tolleson  0.47  0.51  0.58 1.68 4.24 4.91 
Wickenburg  1.02 1.33 3.43  6.10 10.93 11.39 
Youngtown      0.96 1.00 1.25 1.30 
 
 
SOURCE: Data provided by Maricopa County Planning and Development Department. 
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TABLE 2 
  Sales Taxes as a Share of General Revenue 































      6.43* 
 
*Data for 1999-2000 are for all local government (counties, municipalities, townships, special 
districts, and school districts with sufficient autonomy to qualify as independent governments) 
rather than all municipalities. 
 
NOTE: Sales taxes in this table include general and selective sales taxes that are part of general 
revenue from own sources.  General revenue from own sources (which also includes other taxes, 
current charges for commodities and services other than liquor store sales, and miscellaneous 
revenue) is one of two categories that make up general revenue; the other is intergovernmental 
revenue. 
SOURCES: U.S. Census Bureau, City Government Finances in 1969-70, Series GF70-No. 4 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [henceforth, GPO], 1971), table 3, p. 7, 
table 5, p. 9; idem, City Government Finances in 1979-80, Series GF80, No. 4 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1981), table 3, p. 10, table 5, p. 13; idem, City Government Finances: 1989-90, Series 
GF/90-4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), table 3, p. 4, table 5, p. 7; idem, Government Finances 






     
 